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ERISA and the Law of Succession
T.P. GALLANTS*
Two trends in American law are on a collision course. The first is the
federalization of employee benefit law under ERISA. The second is the extension
of state succession law into the realm of nonprobate transfers. Recent Supreme
Court decisions hold that ERISA trumps contrary state law, and Congress has
shown no interest in limiting the statute's broad preemption. This Article
advocates a second-best solution: the incorporation of substantive rules from the
Restatement Third of Property and the Uniform Probate Code into the federal
common law interpreting ERISA. The Article examines how this proposal would
work in five areas of conflict: survivorship, antilapse, revocation on divorce,
revocation by homicide, and the elective share. In each case, the Article
demonstrates how the incorporation of Restatement or uniform law into federal
common law would achieve the proper result.
Two important trends in American private law are on a collision course.
The first trend is the federalization of employee benefit law. Before 1974,
pensions were viewed as contracts between employer and employee.' As
such, they were largely regulated by state law.2 The qualified plan provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code did set some federal standards, 3 but most rules
governing the creation and administration of pension plans were rules of state
law. That all changed in 1974 when Congress enacted the Employee
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1 See Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and the Problem
of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 LoY. LA. L. REV. 1063, 1114-15
(1997) (describing the initial "gratuity theory" of pensions and how it gave way in the early and
mid-twentieth century to the view that a pension was "part of a contractual agreement between
employer and employee, not simply a gift").
2 See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Brennan, 202 N.W.2d 923, 926 (Wis. 1973) ("[A]ctions under
employee-benefit plans are typically grounded in contact for recovery of benefits."); Cantor v.
Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 171 N.E.2d 518, 521 (Ohio 1960) ("[Pension] arrangements will give
rise to contractual rights enforceable by the employee.... ."); In re Schenectady Ry. Co., 93 F.
Supp. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) (viewing the pensions at issue as part of "the terms of the
contract").
3 See WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY
59-63 (1976) (discussing the history of the Internal Revenue Code's impact on pension plans).
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Retirement Income Security Act, known as ERISA. 4 ERISA federalized
pension law, establishing federal rules governing the creation, administration,
and termination of most pension plans. 5 To illustrate ERISA's scope,
consider the main headings of the statute:
Title I. Protection of Employee Benefit Rights
Definitions
Part 1. Reporting and Disclosure
Part 2. Participation and Vesting
Part 3. Funding
Part 4. Fiduciary Responsibility
Part 5. Administration and Enforcement
Part 6. Group Health Plans
Part 7. Group Health Plan Portability, Access, and Renewability
Requirements
Title 11. Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code
Title III. Miscellanea
Title IV. Plan Termination Insurance6
Yet ERISA did more than federalize all of these aspects of pension law. It also
occupied the field. Section 514(a) of ERISA provides in pertinent part that Titles I
and IV, concerning the protection of employee benefit rights and pension plan
termination, "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... "7
The second and countervailing trend is the unification of the state laws
governing probate and nonprobate transfers. At the forefront here are the Uniform
Probate Code (hereinafter "UPC"),8 Article II of which was revised substantially
4 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
5 For the plans not covered by ERISA, see 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2000).
6 JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 90 (3d
ed. 2000).
7 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104(aXl)(D) (2000) ("[A] fiduciary
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and ... in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with [ERISA]") (emphasis supplied).
For a concise introduction to ERISA preemption, see Jeffrey G. Sherman, Domestic
Partnership and ERISA Preemption, 76 TUL. L. REv. 373,392-403 (2001).
8 UNIF. PROB. CODE, 8 U.L.A. Prs. I & 1 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
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in 1990,9 and the new Division II of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills
and Other Donative Transfers (hereinafter "Restatement Third"), published in
2003.10 Division II of the Restatement Third and Article II of the U-PC are
premised on the functional similarity between wills and will substitutes' such as
inter vivos trusts, life insurance policies, and pension plans, all of which readily
serve as vehicles for the deathtime transmission of wealth, albeit outside of the
probate process. 11 Because the Restatement Third and the UPC see these
nonprobate transfers as functionally similar to transfers within probate, they have
extended to these will substitutes-including pension plans--many of the rules of
state law that traditionally applied only to wills. 12
Put simply: what should happen when there is a collision between the federal
law of ERISA and a state law governing nonprobate transfers? The decisions of
the United States Supreme Court make it clear that, in such an event, ERISA's
preemption provision trumps the application of state law.
The most recent Supreme Court decision directly on point appeared in 2001
in the case of Egelhoffv. Egelhoff.13 David and Donna Egelhoff, residents of the
State of Washington, were married and later divorced. During the -marriage,
David had named Donna as the beneficiary of two benefits sponsored by his
employer: a pension plan and a life insurance policy. As employee benefits, both
the pension and the life insurance were governed by ERISA. Two months after
the divorce, David was seriously injured in a car accident and died. At his death,
9 For an overview of the 1990 revisions of Article II, see generally Lawrence H. Averill,
Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REv. 891
(1992).
10 See Press Release, American Law Institute, The American Law Institute Publishes
Second Volume of Restatement of the Law Third, Property (Wills and Other Donative
Transfers) (April 25, 2003), at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr042203c.htm (last visited June 21, 2003)
(announcing the publication on April 22, 2003, of the Restatement Third's second volume,
addressing nonprobate transfers among other topics).
11 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 7.2 (2003) (providing that "to the extent appropriate" nonprobate transfers should be "subject
to substantive restrictions on testation and to rules of construction and other rules applicable to
testamentary dispositions"); UNIF. PROB. CODE Art. 11, Pt. 7, general cmt., 8 U.L.A. PT. 1 181
(1998 & Supp. 2003) (outlining changes made in the 1990 revision to Article 11 to harmonize
the treatment of probate and nonprobate transfers); UNF. PROB. CODE Art. I, Pt. 8, general
cmt., 8 U.L.A. PT. I 206 (1998 & Supp. 2003) (same). See generally John H. Langbein, The
Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108
(1984) (providing the seminal analysis of the growing use of nonprobate mechanisms to
transfer wealth and how this trend should affect the law of probate).
12 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note. 11, § 7.2 cmt. a ("[A] will substitute is therefore,
to the extent appropriate, subject to substantive restrictions on testation and to rules of
construction and other rules applicable to testamentary dispositions."); UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-
701 to -711, 2-801 to -804, 8 U.L.A. PT. 1 181-222 (1998 & Supp. 2003) (providing rules of
construction and other rules applicable to all governing instruments).
1 532 U.S. 141 (2001). The following discussion of the facts is taken from id. 144-46.
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Donna was still listed in the company's records as the beneficiary of the pension
and the life insurance. David's children from an earlier marriage, who were also
his heirs in intestacy, claimed, among other things, that they were entitled to the
pension and life insurance proceeds by operation of Washington state law. The
children invoked Section 11.07.010 of the Revised Code of Washington, which
provided in pertinent part:
(2)(a) If a marriage is dissolved or invalidated, a provision made prior to that
event that relates to the payment or transfer at death of the decedent's interest in a
nonprobate asset in favor of or granting an interest or power to the decedent's
former spouse is revoked. A provision affected by this section must be
interpreted, and the nonprobate asset affected passes, as if the former spouse
failed to survive the decedent ....
(5) As used in this section, "nonprobate asset" means those rights and interests of
a person having beneficial ownership of an asset that pass on the person's death
under only the following written instruments or arrangements other than the
decedent's will:
(a) A payable-on-death provision of a life insurance policy, employee benefit
plan, annuity or similar contract, or individual retirement account[.] 14
By a vote of seven to two, the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted the
application of the Washington statute on these facts. 15 Writing for the majority,
Justice Thomas made two main points. First, the text of ERISA expressly
preempts state laws to the extent that they "relate to" an employee benefit plan.16
The Washington statute relates to an employee benefit plan, and is thus
preempted here, because it would require the benefits administrator to pay
benefits to the beneficiaries chosen by state law (David's children), rather than to
the one named in the beneficiary designation forms (Donna). 17 Second, by
requiring the benefits administrator to become familiar with the laws of a
particular state, the Washington statute would interfere with a central goal of
ERISA, namely the national uniformity of employee benefit administration.18
The Supreme Court's conclusion of law, that ERISA precluded the
application of the Washington state statute, is consistent with the text of ERISA
and the Court's earlier holdings. Yet the factual outcome of the case, that the
divorced spouse received the pension and life insurance benefits, is extremely
14 In re Estate of Egelhoff, 989 P.2d 80, 84-85 (Wash. 1999), rev'd, 532 U.S. 141 (2001)
(quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 11.07.010 (1993)).
15 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 146.
161d. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000)).
'
71d. at 147.
18 Id at 148-49.
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troubling. The proper result-far more consistent with the probable intention of
David, the property owner19-would have been achieved by applying the rule of
revocation on divorce.
Yet the Egelhoff case is even more troubling than that. By emphasizing the
broad sweep of ERISA preemption, the Court's decision opened the door to the
wholesale nullification of attempts at the state level to unify the law of probate
and nonprobate transfers. Put differently: Egelhoff was not simply about one
state's rule of revocation on divorce. Rather, the case has implications for many
other rules of state law-endorsed in the Restatement Third and codified
throughout the UPC-that treat pension beneficiary-designation forms as the
functional equivalent of a will.
So far, we have been talking about revocation on divorce. But there are four
additional rules, now at risk, that attempt to harmonize the treatment of probate
and employee benefit transfers. These are the rules governing survivorship, lapse,
the elective share, and revocation by homicide.
The first of these rules governs survivorship. Imagine that we have an
employee, Adam, who has named his brother, Benjamin, as the beneficiary of his
pension. Adam dies. One day later, Benjamin dies. The terms of the plan provide
that proceeds will be paid to the beneficiary if he or she survives the employee.
The plan does not require any particular period of survivorship, so surviving by
one instant is sufficient. Suppose that the relevant state law tracks Section 2-702
of the UPC (functionally the same as Section 3 of the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act), which requires survivorship by 120 hours.20 The rationale for this
provision, which is endorsed by the Restatement Third,21 is that it makes little
sense-and would be inconsistent with Adam's wishes-for the proceeds to pass
to Benjamin unless Benjamin is alive to enjoy them. 22 Benjamin having died so
soon after Adam, it makes more sense to treat Benjamin as predeceased. But if we
apply the Supreme Court's decision in Egelhoff, the state-law provision would be
preempted.
19 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights
Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REv. 223, 228-29 (1991) (explaining
the provisions of UPC § 2-804 in terms of the decedent's "likely intent").
2 0 See UNIW. PROB. CODE § 2-702(b), 8 U.L.A. PT. 1182 (1998 & Supp. 2003) (providing
that "for purposes of a provision of a governing instrument that relates to an individual
surviving an event, including the death of another individual, an individual who is not
established by clear and convincing evidence to have survived the event by 120 hours is
deemed to have predeceased the event"); UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH Acr § 3 (1993), 8B
U.LA. 149 (1998 & Supp. 2003) (adopting the same rule).
21 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 11, § 7.2 cmt. c (stating that imposing a minimum
120-hour requirement of survivorship "usually better serves the donor's intent").
22 See Edward C. Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC's New Survivorship
and Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1091, 1094-95 (1992) (discussing the rationale for
§ 2-702's 120-hour survivorship requirement).
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The second rule at risk under Egelhoffgovems lapse. Again imagine that our
employee, Adam, has named his brother, Benjamin, as the pension beneficiary.
When Adam dies, suppose that Benjamin is already dead, but Benjamin has three
surviving children. The terms of the plan provide that proceeds will be paid to the
beneficiary if he or she survives the employee. Having failed to survive Adam,
Benjamin would be cut out-in formal terminology, the gift to Benjamin would
lapse-and the proceeds would pass through Adam's probate estate. Suppose that
the relevant state law tracks the antilapse provisions of Section 2-706 of the UPC:
where a governing instrument names a beneficiary who fails to survive but leaves
descendants who do survive, a substitute gift is created in those descendants. 23
Thus, under state law, the proceeds would pass not through Adam's probate estate
but to Benjamin's children who survive Adam. This result is endorsed by the
Restatement Third because it accords with Adam's probable intention;24 indeed,
the purpose of the state rule is to effectuate his likely intention. But if we apply
the Egelhoffdecision, the state statute would be preempted.
The third rule concerns a surviving spouse's elective share. Again imagine
that our employee, Adam, has named his brother, Benjamin, as the beneficiary of
his pension plan. Adam retires and then meets and marries Eve.25 Later, Adam
dies. Under the terms of the plan, the remaining proceeds are to be paid to
Benjamin as the named beneficiary. Yet most states (other than community-
property jurisdictions) have statutes entitling a surviving spouse to elect a share of
the decedent's property.26 As the Restatement Third explains, the purpose of
23 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-706(b)(1), 8 U.L.A. PT. 1190 (1998 & Supp. 2003) ("[If the
beneficiary designation is not in the form of a class gift and the deceased beneficiary leaves
surviving descendants, a substitute gift is created in the beneficiary's surviving descendants.").
24 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 11, § 5.5 cmt. f ("Antilapse statutes establish a
strong rule of construction, designed to carry out presumed intention."); id § 7.2 cmt. f ("[T]he
principles of § 5.5 ... apply to a will substitute that requires the donee to survive the donor.").
25 By marrying Adam after his retirement, Eve is not eligible for a spousal annuity under
federal pension law. On such spousal annuities, see generally LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note
6, at 577-87. But even if an annuity were involved, the UPC's elective share remains a more
thoughtful and comprehensive approach to spousal protection. This can easily be illustrated if
we imagine that, at the time of the marriage, Eve was working and was a year or two from
retirement. In such an event, Adam-but still not Eve-would be entitled to a federal spousal
annuity. Id. at 585. This lopsided result would not occur under the UPC's elective-share
provisions, which were specifically designed to handle the late-in-life remarriage. See generally
Waggoner, Multiple-Marriage Society, supra note 19, at 247-48 (explaining the UPC's
marital-partnership theory and the adoption of an accrual-type elective share system in § 2-
201); John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share,
22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 319-20 (1987) (giving an example of how the accrual-type
elective share would provide for the surviving spouse of a late-in-life remarriage).
26 See Langbein & Waggoner, Redesigning, supra note 25, at 304-06 (analyzing the
elective share and comparing it to community-property regimes).
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these statutes is to protect the spouse from disinheritance. 27 Traditionally, the
elective share applied only to property passing through probate and did not extend
outside of probate to pension or life insurance proceeds.28 However, newer
statutes, such as the UPC, 29 treat probate and nonprobate transfers alike for
purposes of the elective share.30 The obvious and worthy rationale for this
approach-as explained in the commentary to the Restatement Third3 1-is to
prevent the decedent from using nonprobate mechanisms to bypass, hence nullify,
the surviving spouse's elective share.32 So is Eve entitled to a portion of Adam's
remaining pension benefits? The answer under state law would be yes, but the
answer under ERISA and Egelhoffwould be no.
The fourth and final rule is that of revocation by homicide, also known as the
slayer rule. Again imagine that our employee, Adam, has named his brother,
Benjamin, as the beneficiary of his pension. Benjamin feloniously and
intentionally kills Adam. Is Benjamin still entitled to the pension benefits? Under
the laws of many states, 33  the Restatement Third,34  and the
27 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 11, § 9.1 cmt. b ("The purpose of the elective
share is to grant the decedent's surviving spouse an appropriate protection against being
disinherited."); see also Waggoner, Multiple-Marriage Society, supra note 19, at 236-42
("Disinheritance of a surviving spouse brings into question the fundamental nature of the
economic rights of each spouse in a marital relationship and the manner in which society views
the institution of marriage."); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition,
59 Mo. L. REv. 21, 47 (1994) ("No matter what the decedent's intent, the separate-property
states recognize that the surviving spouse has a claim to some portion of the decedent's
estate.").
28 See Waggoner, Multiple-Marriage Society, supra note 19, at 239-41 (discussing the
traditional elective share).
29 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-205, 8 U.L.A. PT. 1105 (1998 & Supp. 2003) (including the
decedent's nonprobate transfers to others in the augmented estate, hence subject to the surviving
spouse's elective share).
30 For some examples of non-UPC statutes treating pension assets as subject to the
surviving spouse's elective share, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1 to -3.4 (2001 & Supp. 2003)
(providing for the transfer of pension and insurance proceeds by way of the elective share); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Michie 2002) (same).
31 See RESTATEMENT TH1RD, supra note 11, § 9.2 cmt. b (explaining that the "objective"
of the UPC's augmented estate is to "assur[e] that the surviving spouse obtains a fully equal
share of the marital assets").
32 See UNIF. PROB. CODE Art. II, Pt. 2, general cmt., 8 U.L.A. Pr. 1 100 (1998 & Supp.
2003) (explaining the UPC's aim of preventing fraud when the "decedent seeks to evade the
spouse's elective share by engaging in various kinds of nominal inter-vivos transfers").
33 See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CiN. L. REV. 803,
805 n. 12 (1993) (listing only six states that do not have a slayer statute: Delaware, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, and New York).
34 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 11, § 8.4 cmt. k (applying the slayer rule to "any
revocable disposition or appointment of property made by the victim to the slayer in a donative
document").
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UPC, 35 the answer would be no: by killing Adam, Benjamin has caused the
beneficiary designation in his favor to be revoked. Yet ERISA has no equivalent
of the slayer rule; instead, ERISA provides that benefits should be paid to the
person named in the plan documents,36 so Benjamin would still be entitled to the
proceeds. The absurdity of this result was brought to the attention of the U.S.
Supreme Court when it was hearing the Egelhoff case,37 but the majority opinion
declined to address concerns about the preemption of the slayer rule, observing
that "[t]hose statutes are not before us, so we do not decide the issue." 38
Yet the issue cannot be avoided. The proceeds of employee benefits are an
increasingly important component of American wealth,39 and the collisions
between the federal law of ERISA and the state law of succession to property will
become more and more frequent.
The drafters of the UPC predicted these conflicts and tried to resolve them. In
each of the five scenarios we have explored-revocation on divorce,
survivorship, lapse, the elective share, and revocation by homicide-the UPC's
drafters inserted the following language into the relevant Code section:
If this section or any part of this section is preempted by federal law with
respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered by this
section, a person who, not for value, receives the payment, item of property, or
any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is
obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally
liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or
benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to it were this section or part
of this section not preempted.40
35 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803(cX1)(i), 8 U.L.A. Pr. 1 51 (Supp. 2003) ("The felonious
and intentional killing of the decedent revokes any revocable disposition or appointment of
property made by the decedent to the killer in a governing instrunent.").36 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (2000) (defining "beneficiary" as "a person designated by a
participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan").
37 See Brief of Amici Curiae National Conference of State Legislatures et al. at 15-16,
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (No. 99-1529); Brief of Amici Curiae State of
Washington et al. at 13-14, Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (No. 99-1529).
38 Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001).
39 According to the Employee Benefit Research Institute "[a]s of year-end 2001, total
retirement plan assets [in the United States] amounted to $10.69 trillion." Employee Benefit
Research Institute, Retirement Plan Assets: Year-End 2001 1 (2002), at
http://www.ebri.org/facts/0902fact.pdf (last visited May 29, 2003).
40 UNF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-702(f)(2), 2-706(e)(2), 8 U.L.A. PT. 1 124, 184, 192 (1998 &
Supp. 2003); UNW. PROB. CODE §§ 2-803(iX2), 2-804(h)(2), 8 U.LA. Pr. I 52, 56 (Supp.
2003).
[Vol. 65:185
ERISA AND THE LA W OF SUCCESSION
Put simply: the idea was to create a constructive trust,4 1 an equitable remedy that
would require the winner under federal law to transfer the property or its value to
the winner under state law. Although clever, the idea of using a constructive trust
was bound to be unsuccessful given the current legal landscape. Why?
Constructive trusts are creatures of state law, and the decisions of the Supreme
Court have made it clear that ERISA's preemption provision trumps the
application of contrary state law. In Egelhoff and in the 1997 case of Boggs v.
Boggs,42 the Supreme Court specifically rejected the possibility that state law
could be used to award the property to a person other than the beneficiary
required by ERISA.43 Thus, remedies arising from state law, such as the
constructive trust provisions of the UPC, are ineffective against ERISA's broad
preemption.44
Let us now examine potential solutions to this mess-in fact, three solutions,
each of which takes the fact of preemption under current law as a given.
The first potential solution is for Congress to amend ERISA. This might be
done in one of two ways. Congress could amend the substantive provisions of
ERISA to incorporate the rules of revocation on divorce, survivorship, lapse,
elective share, and revocation by homicide discussed here. Alternatively,
Congress could amend ERISA's preemption provision to permit state legislatures
to use constructive trusts in the area of succession, as attempted in the UPC;
employee benefits administrators would distribute proceeds according to the
terms of ERISA and the plan documents, then state law could require the
recipient to transfer the property to its rightful owner.
The second potential solution is to encourage employers who offer employee
benefit plans to incorporate the rules we have been discussing into the plan
documents. 45 This approach solves the problem of preemption of state law,
because ERISA itself requires plan administrators to discharge their duties "in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan."'46
41 On consructive trusts, see generally AusTIN W. ScoTr, WILLIAM F. FRATCHER &
MARK L. ASCHER, Scorr ON TRUSTS § 462 (4th ed. 1987 & Supp. 2002).
42 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997).
43 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 149 n.3 (arguing that such an approach would simply cause the
"costs of delay and uncertainty" to be "passed on to beneficiaries, thereby thwarting the
ERISA's objective of efficient plan administration"); Boggs, 520 U.S. at 842-43 (rejecting the
respondents' argument that state law does not conflict with ERISA where the law "affect[s]
only the disposition of plan proceeds after they have been disbursed" by the plan to the named
beneficiary).
44 See also Melton v. Melton, 324 F.3d 941, 944-45 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that ERISA
preempts an attempt to use Illinois constructive-trust law to shift life insurance proceeds away
from the named beneficiary).
45 This suggestion was made during the question-and-answer session at the symposium.
The idea is intriguing and certainly merits discussion. I thank the questioner for raising it.
46 29 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(1)(D) (2000).
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The third potential solution rests on the insight that ERISA's preemption
clause is not triggered if the statute is interpreted according to federal common
law.47 It is well settled that federal courts have the power to create federal
common law under ERISA.48 Thus, the third solution proposes that federal courts
incorporate rules governing nonprobate transfers into federal common law and
then use those federal rules to interpret ERISA. This solution is more complex
than the two discussed above. How would it operate? A good illustration is
provided by a recent case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson,49 decided in July 2002. Jimmie
Johnson was an employee of General Electric. In 1996, he attempted to change
the beneficiary of his employer-sponsored life insurance, but in completing the
form he made a number of errors, including checking the box for a policy in
which he was not enrolled rather than the policy in which he was enrolled. The
question for the court: was the new beneficiary designation form effective? The
prevailing case law in the Seventh Circuit held that strict compliance with the
necessary formalities was required in order to make the new form effective.50
Johnson's would-be beneficiary argued that the court should take note of Illinois
insurance law, which contains a doctrine of substantial compliance: as long as the
owner of an insurance policy substantially complies with the requirements of the
form, a change-of-beneficiary form will be effective.51 In light of Egelhoff, the
judges of the Seventh Circuit held that the Illinois doctrine of substantial
47 On federal common law, see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
ch. 6 (3d ed. 1999); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 60 (6th ed. 2002); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REv. 881 (1986); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12
PACE L. REV. 263 (1992).
4 8 Any number of citations might be proffered to support this statement. For two recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions, see Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 377
(2002); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,497 (1996).
49 297 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2002). The following discussion of the facts is taken from id at
560-61. See also Administrative Committee for the H.E.B. Investment and Retirement Plan v.
Harris, 217 F. Supp. 2d 759 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (using the slayer rule as a rule of federal common
law to interpret ERISA).
50 Metropolitan Life, 297 F.3d at 566; see also Schmidt v. Sheet Metal Workers' National
Pension Fund, 128 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a pension beneficiary designation,
written on the wrong form but clearly evidencing the decedent's intention, was ineffective). But
see Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554, 564-65 (4th Cir. 1994) (adopting
substantial compliance as federal common law).
" Metropolitan Life, 297 F.3d at 564-65 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wise, 184 F.3d
660, 663-65 (7th Cir. 1999) for the proposition that a change of beneficiary will be effective
under Illinois law where "the party asserting that a change has occurred [has established] (1) the
certainty of the insured's intent to change his beneficiary; and (2) that the insured did everything
he could have reasonably done under the circumstances to carry out his intention to change the
beneficiary"); see also Dooley v. James A. Dooley Assoc. Employees Ret. Plan, 442 N.E.2d
222, 226-27 (Ill. 1982) (applying substantial compliance).
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compliance, as a rule of state law, was preempted.52 But they went on to
incorporate the doctrine of substantial compliance into federal common law and
then used that to interpret ERISA. 53 They held that Johnson had substantially
complied with the requirements of the change-of-beneficiary form, hence the
form was effective. Following the model of Metropolitan Life, federal courts
could theoretically incorporate other aspects of the state law of nonprobate
transfers into the federal common law of ERISA. Yet an important question
remains: how should federal courts respond if state law varies from one
jurisdiction to another? Here, too, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Metropolitan
Life is instructive. As the court stated, "We recognize... the need to ensure
uniformity in ERISA jurisprudence, and [] the principle that 'federal common law
should be consistent across the circuits.' ,,54 Thus, the Seventh Circuit did not
transform the Illinois case law on substantial compliance into federal common
law. Rather, the judges took the essence of substantial compliance and made it a
uniform doctrine. So what might be the source, where necessary, of a uniform
federal common law of succession to property? Two likely sources of law are the
Restatement Third and the UPC. In fact, the idea of converting the law of the
Restatement and the UPC into federal common law for the purpose of interpreting
ERISA has a certain elegance and has been the subject of considerable
discussion.55
Of these three solutions, which one is the best? In my judgment, the first
solution is the ideal, but the third solution is the most realistic.
The first solution-amending ERISA, particularly so as to permit state
legislatures to use .UPC-style constructive trusts in the area of succession-is the
most satisfying. It would maintain the uniformity of employee benefit
administration, which is a significant federal concern, while respecting the
succession law of individual states, some of which have chosen to unify their
treatment of probate and nonprobate transfers while other states have not so
chosen. The unfortunate reality, however, is that Congressional amendment of
52 Metropolitan Life, 297 F.3d at 566.
53 Id. at 567-69.
54 Id at 567 (quoting Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554, 564 (4th Cir.
1994)).
55 By way of example: this approach was informally discussed at the Association of
American Law Schools' conference on "Defining the Family in the Millennium" in March
2001; it is explicitly put forward by the commentary to the UPC (see UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-
804 cmt., 8 U.L.A. PT. I 57 (Supp. 2003) ("Because the Uniform Probate Code contemplates
multistate applicability, it is well suited to be the model for federal common law absorption."));
and it is advocated in David S. Lebolt, Making the Best of Egelhoff: Federal Common Law for
ERISA-Preempted Beneficiary Designations, 28 J. PENSION PLANNING & COMPLIANCE 29 (Fall
2002) (arguing for the approach in the context of divorce and homicide but not addressing the
other three areas of conflict-lapse, survivorship, and elective share--examined in the present
article).
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ERISA will not occur in the foreseeable future. Despite extensive litigation and
considerable confusion about the scope of ERISA preemption,56 Congress has
repeatedly declined to solve the problem. There is no reason to think it will act in
the short or medium term.
In the face of Congressional inaction, we are forced to consider the second
and third solutions. The second solution-encouraging employers to re-write their
plans to incorporate the state-law provisions discussed in this Article-sounds
good at first blush but ultimately will not succeed, for two reasons. First,
exhortations will not be fully effective, because not all employers will choose to
amend their plans. Second, administrators may only follow the terms of plan
documents "insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with"
ERISA.57 Thus, amendments to the plan would only be effective for matters on
which ERISA has no substantive provision to the contrary, an example being
revocation on divorce; ERISA has no rule on the subject, so a rule in the plan
would be effective as a gap-filler. Yet where ERISA has substantive
requirements, they cannot be overridden by the terms of an individual plan. For
example, plan amendments would not be able to implement a UPC-style elective
share, because ERISA has its own rules governing spousal rights. 58 In short,
employer amendment of plans may work in some circumstances, but not in all.
We are therefore left with the third solution: incorporation of state-law
principles, such as those articulated in the Restatement Third and the UPC, into
federal common law. This solution, although elegant, requires an important
caveat. The substantive rules articulated by the Restatement Third and the UPC
sometimes reflect minority, rather than widely-accepted, positions. This is easy to
56 For examples of recent U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting ERISA's preemption
provision in other contexts, see Kentucky Ass'n. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S.Ct. 1471,
1475 (2003) (holding that state laws of general application that have some bearing on insurers
do not fall within the insurance exception to ERISA preemption); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.
v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 373 (2002) (holding that an Illinois statute requiring HMOs to provide
independent review of disputes between primary care physicians and IHMOs regulated
insurance and thus was not preempted by ERISA); California Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Const., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997) (holding that California's
prevailing wage law does not "relate to" ERISA plans and is not preempted by ERISA);
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 841 (1988) (holding that
ERISA preempts a Georgia state statute enacted to forbid garnishment of wages under an
ERISA-regulated plan). See also Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CH. L. REv. 1105, 1105-06 (1988)
(observing that ERISA's "overbroad" preemption provision "has wreaked aimless interference
upon state regulation of areas such as health insurance that are quite peripheral to pension
policy" and that "[n]either a substantial string of Supreme Court cases nor occasional
Congressional repair has been able to cure the mess").
57 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(D) (2000).
58 See generally LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 6, at 577-87 (discussing spousal
annuities required by ERISA as amended by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984).
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illustrate. Imagine the same facts as in Egelhoff except that the beneficiary
designations named not Donna but a son born to Donna by another man. The
UPC and Restatement Third would apply the rule of revocation-on-divorce not
only to the former spouse (Donna) but also to any relatives of the former spouse
who are not relatives of the decedent (Donna's son).59 Substantively, this result is
correct because it best effectuates the most likely intention of the property owner
(David), who has little reason to wish to benefit a relative who is not his.60 Yet the
UPC and Restatement Third provisions are comparatively new, and their
approach is currently in the minority; most states still follow the traditional
approach of applying revocation-on-divorce to the former spouse only.61 It is
somewhat troubling to incorporate into federal common law rules of state law that
have not achieved widespread acceptance among state legislatures. The ideal
solution-our first solution, above-would not require this. It would leave to
individual states the decision whether to unify the treatment of probate and
nonprobate transfers. But we do not live in that ideal world; Congress is not likely
to amend ERISA's preemption provisions. Accordingly, the question we must
keep in mind is: which solution is practicable and works better than the current
regime in which ERISA preempts all conflicting state laws? The third solution,
using Restatement and uniform law as federal common law, meets that test. The
rules of the Restatement Third and the UPC, even when they are in the minority,
are designed to achieve the correct result. That is far superior to the status quo
under Egelhoff, where substantively incorrect results are the regrettable but
inevitable products of overbroad preemption.
'9 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-804(bX 1), 8 U.LA. PT. 154 (Supp. 2003) ("[T]he divorce or
annulment of a marriage revokes any revocable disposition or appointment of property made by
a divorced individual to his [or her] former spouse in a governing instrument and any
disposition or appointment created by law or in a governing instrument to a relative of the
diworced individual's former spouse.") (alterations in original) (emphasis supplied);
RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 11, § 4.1 cmt. o, illus. 12 ("If the controlling revocation
statute provides only that the devise to [the former spouse] is revoked, the court should
effectuate the purpose of the statute by extending its terms to revoke the devise to [the former
spouse]'s children."); id. § 7.2 cmt. f ("The principles of § 4.1(b) on revocation caused by the
dissolution of marriage fully apply to revocable will substitutes.").
60 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-804 cnt., 8 U.L.A. PT. I 56 (Supp. 2003) (explaining that
because "the former spouse's relatives are likely to side with the former spouse... seldom
would the transferor have favored" leaving any gift to the relatives unrevoked, so "[t]his
section, therefore, also revokes these gifts"); RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 11, § 4.1 cmt. o,
illus. 12 (stating that a statute limited to the former spouse should be extended to relatives of the
former spouse, as this is necessary to "effectuate the purpose of the statute").
61 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 11, § 4.1 cmt. o (observing that "[m]ost
revocation statutes... limit the scope of the revocation to provisions in favor of the former
spouse").
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CONCLUSION
As employee benefits play a larger and larger role in the transmission of
wealth,6 2 the number of conflicts between ERISA and state succession law will
only increase. This Article discusses three solutions and presents one that is
realistic for the foreseeable future: the incorporation of Restatement and uniform
law into federal common law, which can then be used to interpret ERISA. This
approach aims to steer federal pension law and state succession law, currently on
a collision course, onto something approaching parallel lines.
62 See supra note 39.
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